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CHAPTER 17 
The Scientific Problems with Using Non-Human 
Animals to Predict Human Response to Drugs 
and Disease 
Ray Greek 
President, Americans for Medical Advancement, California, United States 
Lisa A. Kramer 
Professor of Finance, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
1 Introduction 
Every year, and in countries around the world, significant time and resources 
are devoted to the noble cause of developing drugs to treat and cure human 
disease. With rare exception, drug interventions cannot reach commercial­
ization without safety and efficacy having first been demonstrated in animal 
models. The intention of regulations, which require the use of animal models 
in such contexts, is to ensure that only safe and effective drugs end up being 
used by patients. Similarly, it is standard practice for researchers to employ 
animal models in their attempts to understand the way diseases present and 
progress in humans. Unfortunately, there exist serious theoretical and empiri­
cal concerns regarding the standard practice of using non-human animals to 
model human response to perturbations, such as drugs and disease. These 
concerns are important because conducting disease research and drug devel­
opment in a manner that is not supported by science will have suboptimal 
implications for the humans who rely on that research, which encompass the 
entire population. Based on complexity science, modem evolutionary biology, 
and empirical evidence, we demonstrate that animal models have failed as 
predictors of human response. That is, animal models do not and cannot have 
acceptably high predictive value for human response to drugs and disease. By 
this we mean that animal modeling, as a methodology, is for all practical pur­
poses not predictive of human response to drugs and disease; and hence it 
should be abandoned in favor of human-based research and testing, such as 
personalized medicine, a new field that takes into account the unique genetic 
make-up of each individual patient. 
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People are accustomed to hearing about the ethical issues arising from the 
use of non-human animals in biomedical research, testing, and science in gen­
eral. But there are scientific issues with the practice as well. Researchers who 
employ animal modeling often attempt to justify the practice based on claims 
of accurately predicting human response to drugs and disease. For example, 
Giles (2006, p. 981) states: "In the contentious world of animal research, one 
question surfaces time and again: how useful are animal experiments as a way 
to prepare for trials of medical treatments in humans? The issue is crucial, as 
public opinion is behind animal research, only if it helps develop better drugs. 
Consequently, scientists defending animal experiments insist they are essen­
tial for safe clinical trials, whereas animal-rights activists vehemently maintain 
that they are useless". 
One need not search hard to find examples claiming non-human animals 
play an essential role in the quest to treat and cure human disease. For ex­
ample, the American Physiological Society (APA) (2017) states on its website: 
"Animals are used in research to develop drugs and medical procedures to treat 
diseases." Andrew B. Rudczynski, Yale University's associate vice president for 
research administration, stated in a letter to the editor (20n): "[T]he basic re­
search model used by Yale University and its peer institutions is scientifically 
valid and predictive of human disease". Michael F. Jacobson, executive direc­
tor of the Center for Science in the Public Interest (2008) stated: "We must 
test animals to determine whether a substance causes cancer". Huff, Jacobsen, 
and Davis ( 2008, p. 1439) stated: "Chemical carcinogenesis bioassays in animals 
have long been recognized and accepted as valid predictors of potential cancer 
hazards to humans." Lin (1995, p. 1008) stated: "Although the validity of animal 
testing to predict efficacy and or safety in humans has been questioned, it is 
generally believed that data from animal studies can be reasonably extrapolat­
ed to humans with the application of appropriate pharmacokinetic principles 
[ . . . .  ] From an evolutionary point of view, all mammals are similar, because they 
originate from a common ancestor, yet they differentiate because of their dis­
similar environmental adaptations". 
While it can be argued that there may be scientifically justified grounds for 
the use of non-human animals in some contexts, other than those that involve 
predicting human responses, it is most common to see attempts to justify the 
use of non-human animals for applications to human health ( see Kramer 
and Greek (2018), for additional discussion of this point). Therefore, it is ap­
propriate to carefully examine the claimed validity of the animal model for 
predicting human outcomes. 
To that end, consider Trans-Species Modeling Theory (TSMT), a concept 
that was formalized by Greek and Hansen (2013), based on a combination of 
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extensive previous research on complex systems science and evolutionary bi­
ology, as summarized by authors, including Greek and Rice (2012), LaFollette 
and Shanks (1996), LaFollette and Shanks (1998), Shanks and Greek (2008), 
and Shanks and Greek (2009). TSMT states: "While trans-species extrapolation 
is possible when perturbations concern lower levels of organization or when 
studying morphology and function on the gross level, one evolved complex sys­
tem will not be of predictive value for another when the perturbation affects 
higher levels of organization" ( Greek and Hansen, 2013, p. 254 ). That is, according 
to science, the observation of a drug response in one species is uninformative 
about the drug response in another species. This theory is based on complex­
ity science, evolutionary biology, and empirical evidence. In the remainder of 
this article, we explain why the fields of complexity science and evolutionary 
biology are relevant to understanding animal modeling and evaluating the in­
ability of animal models to predict human response to drugs and disease. 
LaFollette and Shanks (1996) and the Medical Research Modernization 
Committee (2006) were among the first to document systematically the meth­
odological failure of using one evolved complex system to model another, in 
terms of predicting outcomes. Subsequent work by Greek and Hansen (2013), 
Greek and Rice (2012), Shanks and Pyles (2007), and Shanks and Greek (2009) 
then led to the development of TSMT, which is the only theory (we intention­
ally use the word theory as opposed to hypothesis; see National Academies of 
Science Engineering Medicine, 2016) that accounts for both past and pres­
ent successes and failures of animal modeling. It is also the only theory that 
explains why animal models will never offer practical predictive value for 
disease and drug research. To be clear, the aforementioned authors did not 
discover evolution, complexity science, or any aspect of probability. Rather, 
they relied on what had been previously published in those disciplines and 
combined various insights to formalize the case against the use of animal mod­
els to predict outcomes in other species. 
TSMT was a paradigm shift in animal modeling analysis. Moreover, TSMT 
was inclusive of valid past criticisms, while simultaneously explaining and 
taking those criticisms further. For example, TSMT obviated the need to point 
out that small differences in environments among lab animals influenced 
results, as many anti-vivisectionists did and continue to do, because even 
under perfect environmental conditions, one evolved complex system would 
not be expected to have predictive value for another. Likewise, there is little 
to no value in analyzing why one species has historically been inadequate for 
predicting human response, because according to TSMT, no species, regard­
less of genetic similarity, will ever be similar enough to another to serve as a 
valid predictive model. TSMT is also more precise and has more explanatory 
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power than general criticisms, such as species differ in their metabolisms. Fur­
thermore, TSMT explains why increasing scientific rigor, the current mantra 
for justifying the use of animal models, will have no effect on predictive value. 
We now tum to examining the three pillars underlying TSMT, comprising 
complex systems science, evolutionary biology, and empirical evidence. 
2 Complex Systems 
Advances in the field of complex systems have highlighted the poor predictive 
value of animal modeling. The study of complex systems and chaotic systems, 
currently usually classified under the general heading of complex systems, 
dates back to the 1950s and began a revolution in physics, similar to that of 
the early 1900s involving relativity and quantum mechanics (Gell-Mann, 1994; 
Gleick, 2008; Goodwin, 2001). 
The following are characteristics of simple systems: 
- They are nothing more than the sum of their parts. 
- They have predictable behaviors. (There are no unanticipated or unexpected 
behaviors.) 
- They are usually composed of just a few components. 
- They can be intuitively understood. 
- They are in equilibrium. (They are non-dynamic.) 
- There are few interactions and feedback loops. (For example, compare a 
primitive barter system in contrast to our modem market-based economy). 
Rosen (1999, p. 392) states: "A system is simple if all its models are simulable. 
A system that is not simple, and that accordingly must have a nonsimulable 
model, is complex". This should give us pause: A complex system is nonsimu­
lable. Note that simulable may mean different things to different people. When 
scientists state that biological complex systems are nonsimulable, they mean 
nonsimulable at the complex level. The aim of researchers who use animal 
models is not to gain insight into the simple systems that are basic building 
blocks of the complex system. For example, at the simple level, we can rely 
on knowledge about simple systems to extrapolate that the final outcome for 
two different species will be the same when, for example, they are perma­
nently deprived of water or they are thrown out of an airplane at 30,000-feet 
elevation. Researchers attempt to use non-human animals to model humans at 
higher, complex levels of organization, because this is the level at which disease 
and drug effects occur. So, when an animal modeler claims that their model 
simulates a human, unless they are speaking of low levels of organization ( much 
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simpler than the levels at which drug and disease responses occur), this is not 
possible. 
In contrast to simple systems, complex systems are characterized by the fol-
lowing ( see Figure 17 .1 for a diagrammatic representation of a complex system): 
Complex systems are composed of many parts that themselves have hierar­
chal levels of organization. 
Complex systems have feedback loops. 
Complex systems exhibit self-organization. 
Complex systems respond to perturbations in a nonlinear fashion. Because 
small changes in a complex system can result in outcomes that are not pro­
portional to the input, one biological complex system can die because of 
what, at first, appears to be a minor change or difference between it and 
another almost identical complex system (Morange, 2001; Pearson, 2002 ). 
For example, Northrop (2011, p. xiv) states: "Early bioengineers, biophysi­
cists, and systems physiologists tried to characterize certain physiological 
regulators as linear and stationary. Initially, linear systems analysis was 
inappropriately applied to certain complex, physiological regulators and 
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FIGURE 17.1 The characteristics of complex systems. 
SOURCE: MARSHALL CLEMENS/IDIAGRAM (HTTPS://WWW.IDIAGRAM.COM) 
Note: A complex system is built out of simple systems. As more and more 
of these simple systems combine and form a complex system, the level of 
organization increases and simulability decreases. 
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control systems ( e.g., pupil regulation and eye movement control), which 
resulted in black-box, closed-loop models in which linear transfer function 
modules were connected to a nonlinear module in a single feedback loop. 
These were phenomenological input/output models that gave little insight 
into the physiology and complexity of the systems". 
- Complex systems demonstrate redundancy and robustness. Complex sys­
tems have redundant parts and, therefore, losing a part may not affect 
function. Adding to this is robustness, which means that perturbations may 
not result in dysfunction. Complex systems have emergent properties that 
Aziz-Alaoui and Bertelle ( 2009, preface) define as follows: "Emergence and 
complexity refer to the appearance of higher-level properties and behaviors 
of a system that obviously comes from the collective dynamics of that sys­
tem's components. These properties are not directly deductable from the 
lower-level motion of that system. Emergent properties are properties of 
the "whole" that are not possessed by any of the individual parts making 
up that whole. Such phenomena exist in various domains and can be de­
scribed, using complexity concepts and thematic knowledges." 
- Examples of emergent properties include the following from Van Regen­
mortel (2002): 
- The three physical states of water and phase transitions, such as boiling 
point. 
- The viscosity of water ( individual water molecules have no viscosity). 
- The color of a chemical. 
- A melody arising from notes. 
- The saltiness of sodium chloride. 
- The specificity of an antibody. 
- The immunogenicity of an antigen. 
- The components of complex systems can be grouped as modules, and the 
modules communicate with each other. Nevertheless, failure in one module 
does not necessarily spread to the system as a whole because of redundancy 
and robustness. 
- Complex systems are dynamic. They communicate with, and change in re­
sponse to, their environment. 
- The whole of a complex system is greater than the sum of its parts, and 
hence complex systems have properties that cannot be determined even 
with total knowledge of the components of the system. This limits the valid­
ity of reductionism when studying complex systems. 
- Importantly for our discussion, complex systems are also very dependent on 
initial conditions; for example, genetic make-up in the context of individuals 
or species. This means that a very small change in the initial conditions of 
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two otherwise identical complex systems ( e.g., monozygotic twin humans), 
may result in sickness for one but not the other. In strains of mice, knocking 
out one gene has been shown to result in death for one strain, while the 
other thrives (Belmaker et al., 2012; Bell and Spector, 2011; Bruder et al., 2008; 
Castillo-Fernandez et al., 2014; Chapman and Hill, 2012; Czyz et al., 2012; 
Dempster et al., 2011; LeCouter et al., 1998; Raineri et al., 2001; Pearson, 2002 ). 
The sensitivity of complex systems, also known as nonlinear dynamic systems, 
to initial conditions, in general, was demonstrated in principle in the 1960s by 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathematician, Edward Lorenz, while 
he was studying a weather model using a computer. Lorenz found significant 
differences in outcomes using his model, when the initial conditions were 
changed by a very small amount: 
On a particular day in the winter of 1961, Lorenz wanted to re-examine a 
sequence of data coming from his model. Instead of restarting the entire 
run, he decided to save time and restart the run from somewhere in the 
middle. Using data printouts, he entered the conditions at some point 
near the middle of the previous run and re-started the model calcula­
tion. What he found was very unusual and unexpected. The data from the 
second run should have exactly matched the data from the first run. 
While they matched at first, the runs eventually began to diverge dra­
matically - the second run losing all resemblance to the first within a 
few "model" months. 
BRADLEY, 2010 
FIGURE 17.2 Plots of the data from two simulations of weather response over time. 
SOURCE: BRADLEY (2010) 
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Plots of the time-series data from two of Lorenz's weather simulations ap­
pear in Figure 17.2. 
Lorenz rounded off a variable to three digits after the decimal instead of 
six, and this resulted in the different values shown in Figure 17.2. While no one 
knows which specific weather condition Lorenz recorded on the Y axis (it is 
commonly assumed that time is shown on the X axis), we do know the fluctua­
tions shown on the right-most portion of the Y axis are between extreme values, 
and thus we see that a tiny perturbation in starting values ( measured in units 
smaller than three decimal places), eventually yielded opposite predictions in 
the simulated weather. This experiment is the origin of expressions, such as, "a 
butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, and it rains in America." Very small changes in 
initial conditions can result in dramatically different outcomes in complex sys­
tems. In fact, this behavior is a defining characteristic of a complex or chaotic 
system (Gleick, 2008). Obviously, Lorenz's computer program was intended to 
simulate weather, but because it lacked sufficiently detailed inputs, the model 
yielded dramatically different outputs depending on very small changes in the 
inputs - the initial conditions. This example demonstrates how a particu­
lar model, in this case a computer program, can be inadequate for simulat­
ing a complex system. Likewise, animal models are inadequate for predicting 
human response to drugs and disease. 
Examples of complex systems include cells, humans, non-human animals, 
ecosystems, economies, ant colonies, social interaction, and the United States 
electrical grid. For more on biological complex systems, see Ahn et al. (2006), 
Gell-Mann (1994), Goodwin (2001), Greek (2013c), Greek and Rice (2012), 
Kitano (2002); Morowitz (2002), Sole and Goodwin (2002), Van Regenmortel 
(2004a, b), Van Regenmortel and Hull (2002), Vojinovic (2015a, b). 
It is not easy to understand complex systems. Consider the following sum­
mary of the necessary background for understanding complex systems: 
This introductory textbook is intended for use in a one-semester course 
to acquaint biomedical engineers, biophysicists, systems physiologists, 
ecologists, biologists, and other scientists, in general, with complex­
ity and complex systems. I have focused on biochemical, genomic, and 
physiological complex systems, and I have also introduced the reader to 
the inherent complexity in economic systems [ . . . .  ] Reader background: 
Readers should have had college courses in algebra, calculus, ordinary 
differential equations, and linear algebra, and, hopefully, engineering 
systems analysis. They should also have had basic college courses in 
chemistry, biochemistry, cell biology, and ideally even in human physi­
ology and anatomy. This is the broad background that is required in the 
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interdisciplinary fields of biomedical engineering, biophysics, systems 
physiology, and economics. 
NORTHROP, 2011, pp. xiii-xvii 
Northrop (2011, p. xiii) also notes: "Broadly stated, we consider that complex­
ity is a subjective measure of the difficulty in describing and modeling a system 
( thing or process), and thus being able to predict its behavior" ( emphasis 
added). Again we note the fact that complex systems are difficult to model in 
terms of being able to predict outcomes to perturbations. 
Vicsek ( 2002, p. 131) states: 
In the past, mankind has learned to understand reality through simplifi­
cation and analysis. Some important simple systems are successful ideal­
izations or primitive models of particular real situations - for example, a 
perfect sphere rolling down an absolutely smooth slope in a vacuum. This is 
the world of Newtonian mechanics, and it ignores a huge number of other, 
simultaneously acting factors. Although it might sometimes not matter 
that details such as the motions of the billions of atoms dancing inside the 
sphere's material are ignored, in other cases reductionism may lead to in­
correct conclusions. In complex systems, we accept that processes that occur 
simultaneously on different scales or levels are important, and the intricate 
behaviour of the whole system depends on its units in a nontrivial way. Here, 
the description of the entire system's behaviour requires a qualitatively new 
theory, because the Laws that describe its behaviour are qualitatively differ­
ent from those that govern its individual units." (Emphasis added) 
Animal modeling seeks to use one complex system, be it a mouse or a monkey, 
to predict responses to perturbations that occur at higher levels of organiza­
tion, of another complex system - a human. To do so ignores the most basic 
fundamental features of complex systems, discussed above. Given those fea­
tures, it is outside the realm of science to use one complex system in expecta­
tion of its having predictive value for another, when the perturbation affects 
higher levels of organization. 
3 Evolutionary Biology 
Informally, evolution can be thought of as small changes in genes (i.e., initial 
conditions) that occur over long periods of time, resulting in new species with 
traits different from those of the ancestor organism. In otherwords, chimpanzees 
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and humans are both different from the primate that we descended from, and 
we are different from each other. But the notion that differences among genes 
can result in new species is separate from the fact that very small differences in 
genes can also lead to members of the same species reacting quite differently 
to drugs and disease. Humans and non-human animals are examples of com­
plex systems that have evolved over time - their initial conditions changed 
in the form of genetic make-up, and these changes affected the organism 
in a nonlinear fashion, just as we saw in Lorenz's computer model of weather. 
Even for two individuals within the same species, small differences in DNA 
can mean the difference between life and death. A tiny difference of one ami­
no acid within the human chromosome is all that separates a patient with 
life-threatening sickle cell anemia from those of us who can live free of that 
condition. Dramatic differences can exist across species without changes in 
amino acid sequences. Genes are regulated, turned on and off, by other genes. 
For example, mice and humans share the gene that allows mice to grow a tail 
( Graham, 2002 ). The reasons humans do not normally grow a tail during devel­
opment is that the gene is never turned on ( or expressed). Differences in gene 
regulation and expression vary within and between species and account for 
differences in response to drugs and disease (Kasowski et al., 2010; Marchetto 
et al., 2013; Morley et al., 2004; Pritchard et al., 2006; Rifkin, Kim and White, 
2003; Rosenberg et al., 2002; Sandberg et al., 2000; Seok et al., 2013; Storey et al., 
2007; Suzuki and Nakayama, 2003; Warren et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2008). So, 
while it is a fact that humans share a large percentage of their genes with other 
mammals, this fact is largely immaterial in terms of predicting how humans 
will respond to perturbations, such as drugs and disease. For example, the pro­
gression of HIV to AI D S ,  which is common in humans, has been very rarely ob­
served in great apes. On the matter of non-human primates, Varki and Altheide 
(2005, p. 1746) write "[I]t is a striking paradox that chimpanzees are in fact not 
good models for many major human diseases/conditions". 
Based on facts from the theory of evolution and complexity science, there 
are robust theoretical reasons to conclude that, for all practical purposes, one 
species will have no predictive value for the response to perturbations that 
occur at higher levels of organization; and drugs and disease affect higher 
levels of organization. Note that we are not saying humans and non-human 
animals cannot ever respond similarly to the same drug or disease. They do 
in some instances. However, in order for there to be scientific merit in using 
non-human animals as predictive models for humans, the models would have 
to have a high predictive value as calculated using concepts we discuss in the 
following section. Consistent with theory, extensive empirical evidence shows 
that animal models do not have high predictive value for human response to 
drugs and disease, rendering their use in that context unscientific. 
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4 Empirical Evidence: The Failure of the Animal Model in Terms of 
Predictive Value for Humans 
We now delve into empirical evidence regarding the inability of the animal 
model to predict human response to drugs and disease. By comparing how well 
an animal-based test or research method corresponds to human results, we 
can determine how much predictive value the modality has. Predictive value 
is measured in science by using the calculations summarized in Table 17.1. In 
the discussion that follows, we refer to quantities from this table, such as gold 
standard, false positive, and false negative. Any given test or system can gener­
ally be compared to a gold standard, which is the most accurate one available 
under reasonable conditions. 
For example, the gold standard for determining whether a patient has a col­
lapsed lung is a computerized axial tomography (CT )  scan of the chest. Even 
clinically insignificant cases of a collapsed lung can be detected with a CT scan 
and clinically significant collapses are detected essentially 100% of the time. 
In reality, patients are assessed with a chest x-ray instead of a CT scan because 
an x-ray is quicker, easier, and less expensive than a CT  scan, and clinically 
significant collapses are detected by x-ray a very, very high percentage of the 
time. To determine the predictive value of the chest x-ray, one would perform 
both diagnostic tests on a group of patients and the calculations in Table 17.1. 
A positive chest x-ray ( an x-ray that revealed a collapsed lung) in light of a 
positive CT scan would be counted as a true positive (TP )  and listed under 
gold standard positive; while a negative chest x-ray (no collapsed lung) in light 
of a negative C T  scan would be listed as true negative (TN) and listed under 
gold standard negative. Similarly, a negative x-ray in light of a positive CT  scan 
would be labeled a false negative (FN); and a positive chest x-ray in conjunc­
tion with a negative CT  scan would be a false positive (FP) (see Nagarsheth and 
Kurek, 2011, for an example of this). 
In the case of evaluating animal models, outcomes in humans would be 
the gold standard. These same calculations can be performed for any test or 
modality where a gold standard can be known in contexts within and outside 
of biomedical science, for example to determine whether a patient has cancer, 
to determine whether a computer model can predict an outcome in engineer­
ing or business, or to determine the predictive value of drug sniffing dogs in 
airports. For more details see Greek ( 2014b ). 
Not all tests or methods need to have a high predictive value to be useful. 
For example, if you devised a method of winning at the blackjack table more 
than 50% of the time and bet appropriately each time and played long enough, 
probabilistically you would beat the house. But in medical science, we need 
much higher predictive values than 0.5. Even a probability of 0.999 can be 
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TABLE 17  . I  Binary classification test and formulas for determining how well a test or  practice 





Sensitivity = T P  /(T P+FN) 








Positive Predictive Value (PPv) = TP /(TP+FP) = % of all positives that are true 
positives 
Negative Predictive Value (NPV) = TN /(FN +TN) = %  of all negatives that are true 
negatives 
Abbreviations: 
T- = Test negative 
T + = Test positive 
FP = False positive 
TP = True positive 
FN = False negative 
TN = True negative 
GS- = Gold standard negative 
GS+ = Gold standard positive 
inadequate. Drugs that harm even a very small percentage of patients, even 
one out of 1,000, have been pulled off the market because of life-threating side 
effects, such as total liver failure, heart attack, or stroke. Examples of widely­
marketed drugs that have been withdrawn due to unanticipated fatalities in­
clude Vioxx ( rofecoxib ), Propulsid ( cisapride ), and Rezulin ( troglitazone ). See 
Graham et al. (2005) and Attarwala (2010) for details on such instances. 
So what is an acceptable level of predictive value to expect from animal 
modeling? To answer this question, first we need to emphasize that accept­
able predictive value, like many things in life, varies depending on the context, 
as the blackjack example illustrates. Consider the case of deeming whether 
a species exhibits the trait of sentience, which is highly valued in the animal 
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protection movement as a feature to take into account when considering the 
ethics of animal modeling. Sentience can be assessed using criteria for which 
we could attempt to measure predictive value; but, nevertheless, a large gray 
zone emerges. Chimpanzees are clearly sentient, as are mammals in general. 
But when we consider invertebrates, the situation becomes less clear. Octopi 
appear to be both sentient and sapient, but what about sponges, worms, jel­
lyfish, and the common fruit fly? To date we do not have strong evidence that 
these entities exhibit sentience, but we may simply lack the power to detect 
sentience in all cases where it exists. Yet, our inability to conclude with cer­
tainty that sponges are sentient does not mean we can ignore the fact that 
chimpanzees do demonstrably exhibit sentience. The precautionary principle 
should be employed in cases where great suffering is at stake, meaning that 
our ability to deem a particular species as sentient should not be predicated 
on the requirement that there exists an assessment method with a predictive 
value as high as 0.99. 
Turning back to the matter at hand, predictive values for responses to drugs 
in development typically cluster around or below 0.5, which makes them no 
more useful for prediction than flipping a coin. Predictive values this low are of 
no use in medical science. When values in the 0.7 to 0.9 range are seen, physi­
cians and medical scientists cannot rely on the results, test, or modality alone, 
without verifying the item in question with other tests or modalities. To do so 
would be unethical; the patient deserves greater certainty before proceeding. 
Science in general relies on consilience, and medical research is not an excep­
tion. In this case, when deciding which modality to use, one must consider 
the mathematics of complex systems and the initial conditions in the form of 
evolutionary biology. Because animal models are used to make the life-altering 
decision of whether to take a drug to human trials or to abandon it, even values 
greater than 0.9 can be deemed inadequate and unacceptably costly in terms 
of the likelihood of adverse human consequences. 
The way around this problem of identifying the right predictive value is 
addressed by Greek and Greek (2004), Greek, Menache and Rice (2012), and 
Shanks and Greek (2009), and is summarized by Kramer and Greek (2018). 
The solution involves the use of human-based research and testing through 
personalized medicine; that is, matching gene( s) to drugs and disease in each 
patient. Based on the science of complex systems and evolutionary biology, 
we know categorically that using non-human animal models has unaccept­
ably low predictive value for human responses to drugs and disease. Thus, on 
balance, the use of animal models in drug development and disease research 
should be abandoned immediately for the same reasons that society has aban­
doned wrong or harmful medical practices such as phrenology, bloodletting, 
and trephination; they were simply ineffective. 
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We now tum to specific examples of the poor predictive value of animal 
models, starting with early empirical evidence dating back as early as the 1990s 
and ending with recent sets of evidence from 2016 that summarize decades of 
findings. 
Data from Suter (1990) and the nth edition of the Catalog of Teratogenic 
Agents (Shepard and Lemire, 2004) demonstrate the importance of using 
predictive values. Suter reported on the development of six drugs where 
humans and non-human animals shared 22 side effects. Suter's data revealed 
that animal models had a positive predictive value of 0.31. That is, if a side ef­
fect was seen in the animal models it had only a 31% chance of being seen in 
humans for these six drugs. This prediction rate, which is below that expected 
from a coin toss (heads we abandon the drug because of danger, and tails we 
continue to develop the drug), illustrates the failure of these animal models as 
predictors for human response. A naive but common retort to this fact is that if 
animal models derailed any drug that would have harmed humans, it is worth 
using animal models. The fallacy of this view becomes evident when consider­
ing the following assessment of empirical evidence on using animal models to 
predict human birth defects. 
The Catalog of Teratogenic Agents lists more than 3,100 agents, of which 
about 1,500 can produce congenital anomalies (birth defects) in experimental 
animals but not in humans. These are known as false positives. Furthermore, 
only about 40 cause birth defects in both humans and non-human animals. 
These are known as true positives. Based on these numbers and the formulas 
in Table 17.11 one can calculate a value of 3°/o for the positive predictive value. 
A positive predictive value of 3°/o tells us that for any given birth defect noted 
in non-human animals, there is only a 3°/o chance that it will also be seen in 
humans. A predictive value of 3°/o is obviously extremely poor but is consistent 
with the general lack of predictive value in using animal models to determine 
whether compounds are harmful to developing fetuses ( see Greek, Shanks and 
Rice, 2011, for more on teratogenicity and animal models). This means that for 
any drug that tests positive for birth defects, when tested for teratogenicity in 
animal models, there is about a 3% chance that it will harm human babies in 
utero. Predictive value does not mean that 3°/o of drugs that would have caused 
birth defects will be abandoned in development. Instead it means that of 100 
drugs tested and shown to harm animal fetuses, about three may harm the 
human fetus. Unfortunately, we do not know which three. So, abandoning a 
drug in development based on a test that has a low predictive value does not 
save babies. Moreover, when human health is involved, low predictive value 
means anything below 90%-95%; and, often times, even a probability of 99% 
is inadequate to base treatment on. The predictive value of animal modeling 
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falls far below 99%; for example, 3% in the above teratogenicity example. For 
more on this point, see Greek (2013a, b, 2014b ), Greek and Greek (2010 ), and 
Shanks, Greek, and Greek ( 2009 ). 
Values this low mean animal modeling per se has, for all practical purposes, no 
predictive value for human response to drugs and disease. Some researchers ar­
gue that any predictive value greater than zero means animal models have some 
predictive value. However, given the scope for serious adverse consequences, 
including death, the threshold number required in medical science has to be 
much higher than the typically observed 3% to 55% range of values seen when 
calculating the predictive value of animal modeling ( see previous references); 
hence the paradigm of animal modeling cannot be justified scientifically in 
this context. Medical science requires higher predictive values than one needs 
for winning at the blackjack table. 
In our discussion of the predictive value of animal models, we have focused 
so far on the context of response to drugs. It is also illuminating to consider 
predictive value in the context of disease research. Scientists are now match­
ing gene response to disease, and great variation is being observed across 
species. For instance, Seok et al. (2013) studied inflammatory processes, such 
as sepsis, in mice and humans and found no correlation between what the 
genes and responses did in mice versus what they did in humans. The follow­
ing statement, by science journalist Dolgin (2013, p. 118), puts Seok's and col­
leagues' findings in context: "Yet, despite the fact that some compounds have 
repeatedly reversed the symptoms of sepsis in animal tests, not a single drug 
has proven effective in human clinical trials, even though more than 30,000 
people have been included in randomized controlled studies, involving candi­
date antisepsis agents over the past 25 years". 
Thus, in searching for a treatment for sepsis, tens of thousands of people 
were exposed to the risks of a new drug, and billions of dollars were wasted 
based on animal studies, the results of which proved unrelated to human out­
comes. Even more patients were unable to access a potentially effective drug 
that might have been identified had the resources been dedicated instead to 
human-based research. 
The failure of animal models in these cases appears to be due to differences 
in gene response between humans and mice (Seok et al., 2013; Warren et al., 
2014). Considering that humans and non-human animals are evolved complex 
systems, there is no reason to expect other diseases or conditions would allow 
animal models to have high predictive value. Indeed, many diseases have been 
studied and similarity in responses among species found only at very low rates 
and usually in retrospect (Enna and Williams, 2009; Hau, 2003; Lin, 1995). (Note 
that basic science research is prone to the same critique. Many researchers now 
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claim that basic research on non-human animals has high predictive value for 
humans. See, for example, Devoy et al., 2012; Groenink, Folkerts and Schuurman, 
2015; Katzner et al., 2009; National Science Foundation, 2011; Rudczynski, 2011; 
van Meer, Graham and Schuurman, 2015. Such claims invite the same scrutiny 
as claims about predictive value in drug development and disease research.) 
Based on the track record of drugs that have been tested on non-human 
animals to date, the poor predictive value of animal models used in preclinical 
research, and the fact that humans and non-human animals are evolved 
complex systems, there is every reason to believe yet-to-be-developed drugs 
identified through the use of animal models will similarly exhibit profoundly 
different responses in non-human animals versus humans. The exceptions to 
this rule occur when the perturbation affects levels of organization where the 
system under analysis is simple or where conserved processes are involved. But 
even when conserved processes are being studied ( e.g., the mechanism for cell 
replication, the cytochrome P 450s, and the presence of various receptors), the 
outcomes to perturbations to these processes vary among species (Greek and 
Rice, 2012 ). 
Turning to other medical applications, around 100 vaccines have been 
shown to be effective against HIV-like viruses in animal models, to date. None 
have been effective in humans (Bailey, 2008; Editorial, 2007; Gamble and Mat­
thews, 2010 ). More than a thousand drugs have been seen to protect against 
nervous system damage in animal models of stroke. Again, none have been 
protective in humans (Dimagl, 2006; Dimagl and Macleod, 2009; Macleod, 
2004; O'Collins et al., 2011; O'Collins et al., 2006; Sena et al., 2007 ). Fouad, Hurd 
and Magnuson (2013) identify over 10,000 publications modeling spinal cord 
injury in rats and mice. Many treatments identified in those publications have 
been effective in non-human animals but failed in humans, and spinal cord 
injury resulting in paralysis remains incurable in humans. 
The predictive value of the above-mentioned medical applications would 
be roughly zero. In order to prove a test or practice has poor predictive value 
( as opposed to predictive value numerically equal to zero), one only has to 
show a relatively small number of failures compared to the successes. The 
above examples are adequate. Conversely, proving a practice has high predic­
tive value requires examples from a large number of studies. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no studies of any kind that show high predictive value 
of animal models for drugs or disease. Drawing on knowledge from complex 
systems and the theory of evolution, one can easily infer that the above ex­
amples are representative of all animal models and are not exceptions to the 
rule. Moreover, the studies described above are a small sample of the many 
such instances that have been recorded in the medical literature showing the 
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animal model's overall lack of predictive value. For more examples see Arrow­
smith (2011a, b ), Chiou et al. (2000 ), Ennever et al. (1987), Fletcher (1978), Grass 
and Sinko (2002), Hughes (2008), Litchfield (1962), Igarashi et al. (1995, 1996), 
Johnson et al. (2001), Kola and Landis (2004), Kummar et al. (2007), Lesko 
and Woodcock (2004), Lumley (1990), Mahmood (2000), Smith and Caldwell 
(1977), Spriet-Pourra and Auriche (1994), van Meer et al. (2012), and Weaver et 
al. (2003). Despite the above, important international regulatory bodies still 
require animal-based research and testing. See for example, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018) and the International 
Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals 
for Human Use (2011). 
The overall consequence of continued reliance on animal models is evi­
dent when considering the costly failures seen in drug development. For the 
past few decades, arguably the period when our advanced scientific sophisti­
cation should have been yielding the greatest progress in drug development, 
the success rate in human clinical trials of drugs that entered those trials, 
based on data from animals, was about 10% (see, e.g., B I O ,  Biomedictracker 
and Amplion, 2016; Smietana, Siatkowski and Moller, 2016). Safety/toxicity and 
efficacy are the two characteristics researchers seek to evaluate when using 
animal models in drug development. But drugs developed using animal mod­
els have systematically failed in human clinical trials for both safety/toxicity 
reasons and efficacy reasons. Moreover, even more drugs have failed when 
prescribed to large numbers of people, dropping the success rate below 10%. 
Granted there are many reasons that drugs fail to enter the market, but these 
are rare in comparison to the frequency with which efficacy and safety issues 
have failed to be revealed by animal modeling. 
Based on our discussion above of evolved complex systems, evolution, and 
the empirical data, we conclude that animal models, overall, do not and can­
not have a numeric predictive value above about 50%; and, hence, we conclude 
that, for all practical purposes, they have no predictive value. By this we do not 
mean the predictive value of any given animal model is exactly equal to zero, 
but rather that the predictive value is so low that it is necessarily below any 
reasonable threshold to be considered useful in medical science in general. 
5 Summary 
Drawing on theoretical principles, based on evolutionary biology and complex 
systems, and based on extensive empirical evidence, the position that animal 
modeling has predictive value for human response to drugs in general has 
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been falsified. TSMT i s  a theory, and, like all scientific theories, i t  i s  consistent 
with this definition from the National Academies of Science Engineering Med­
icine (2016): "In everyday usage, theory often refers to a hunch or a speculation. 
When people say, 'I have a theory about why that happened,' they are often 
drawing a conclusion based on fragmentary or inconclusive evidence. The for­
mal scientific definition of theory is quite different from the everyday meaning 
of the word. It refers to a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature 
that is supported by a vast body of evidence". 
Researchers who aim to improve human outcomes cannot continue to treat 
humans and non-human animals as simple systems and expect results based 
on non-human animals to translate to human patients. TSMT is the first com­
prehensive theory that explains the past failures and apparent successes of 
animal modeling and also explains why animal models will never achieve pre­
dictive value and, thus, should be abandoned. 
We acknowledge that the scientific community as a whole is not yet familiar 
with TSMT; but we are confident that, in time, a consensus will be reached. 
Kramer and Greek (2018) explain the obstacles that must be overcome to 
ensure that drug development and the study of diseases are based on sound 
science. This will require changes to the regulations that currently mandate 
the use of animal models. Furthermore, Kramer and Greek (2018) discuss 
modern techniques that fall under the heading of personalized medicine, 
which offer treatments and cures that are customized to a patient's individual 
genetic make-up and, hence, sidestep the significant risks associated with the 
continued blind reliance on methods arising from the use of animal models. 
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